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Innovation and Reform
in Transboundary Resource
Management: A Critical Look

at the International Boundary
and Water Commission,
United States and Mexico
ABSTRACT
This study examines the prospectsfor administrativeandfunctional reform of the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission,
United States and Mexico. A variety of changes along the border,
demographic, political,and attitudinal,now impinge on the Commission's capacity to manage transboundaryresourceproblems within
its jurisdiction. To cope with these changes, the Commission must
become more responsive to its various border constituencies. Specific
opportunitiesfor assuming new functional commitments are limited
by the Commission's treaty mandate, though additionaldevelopment
is possible in several areas, to include sanitationand water quality,
instreamflow, and creativeapproaches to projectfinancing.
INTRODUCTION
The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) may
well represent the finest example of functional cooperation in transboundary resources management between highly dissimilar countries anywhere
on the globe. For over a century, the United States and Mexico, otherwise
divided by history, culture, wealth, and a host of past antagonisms, have
managed to find diplomatic, cooperative solutions to some of the most
basic controversies in international affairs: the allocation of water, the division of disputed territories, and the management of a range of problems
arising from contiguous development along their common boundary.
In the process the two countries have generated a set of enduring
institutions, institutions that by and large have stood the test of time, insti*Stephen Mumme is Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, Fort Col-

lins, Colorado.
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tutions that rank among the most deeply embedded problem-solving
mechanisms across the spectrum of our bilateral relations.
This record, as so many observers have said before, warrants considerable praise.' Past successes notwithstanding, however, the IBWC is,
like other institutions, a social artifact, imperfect at best, and captive to the
vicissitudes of time. As a transboundary resource management agency,
the Commission's jurisdiction and functions were formed at a historically
propitious moment in response to contextually specific circumstances. As
judicious as the Commission's various architects were, they could not
have anticipated all of the changes that have come to bear on its mandate.
These changes, and the challenges they present to the IBWC's
jurisdiction and functions, are the subject of this paper. The following
pages examine the challenges confronting the Commission from an "ecological" perspective. The first section identifies the changing variables in
the Commission's political environment with an eye to the challenges they
present to older, well-established patterns of bilateral resource management. The second section considers the real constraints on the Commission's capacity to accommodate new demands and pressures on its
jurisdiction and functions, as well as various possibilities for reform. The
third and final section considers the range of options before the Commission, their prospects, and the likely consequences should the Commission
fail to respond to its changing circumstances.
The Changing Ecology of Transboundary Resource
Management along the United States-Mexico Border
It is important to recognize that while the Commission recently
celebrated its centenary, its modern mandate, arising out of the 1944
United States-Mexico Water Treaty, is just 46 years old. The 1944 Treaty,
which functions as an organic stature for the IBWC, continues to define
the limits and possibilities of the present Commission.
Generally, the arrangements created in 1944 have worked remarkably well. The IBWC is composed of two national sections, each responsible to its respective government for policy authority.3 The jurisdiction of
the Commission is technically narrow, limited to those matters directly
involving the boundary.4 Other concerns are the province of each country's domestic agencies. Within its narrow limits, however, the Commis-

1. A. Leibson, The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, 35 Mexican-American
Review 30-34 (1967); Rio Grande Waterfor Peace, Engineering News-Record 33-37 (July 27,
1967); C. Sepulveda, Colorado River Management and InternationalLaw 59, 63-64 in Environmental Management in the Colorado River Basin,( A. Crawford & D. Peterson eds., 1974).
2. TreatyRegarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Feb. 3,1944, U. S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Water Treaty].

3. Id. art. 2.
4. Id.

Winter 1993]

INNOVATIONAND REFORM IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

95

sion's jurisdiction is exclusive and superior to the claims of any and all
domestic agencies.
The functions of the Commission are explicitly defined; they fall
within the three broad categories of (1) liaison-investigation, (2) adjudication, and (3) administration. 5 Its liaison-investigative functions entail
communication and coordination of activities between the two national
sections; the initiation, investigation, and planning of actions and works
deemed necessary to the implementation of goals specified by treaty or
other, subsidiary, agreements; and supplTing pertinent information to its
member governments on their request. Its judicial functions are quite
modest: they derive from the Commission's authority to "settle all differences that may arise between the two Governments with respect to the
interpretation and application of [the 1944 Water Treaty] subject to the
approval of the two Governments." 7 The administrative functions of the
Commission embrace all those activities that are necessary for the implementation of Treaty requirements and the subsidiary agreements reached
under Treaty authority. These functions either are essentially bilateral in
character or may be performed independently by the national sections. In
one domain or the other the Commission and its sections are responsible
for boundary demarcation, channel rectification, construction and maintenance of flood control, water storage, hydroelectric, and drainage works,
construction and maintenance of sanitation and sewage facilities, scheduling water deliveries under treaty, stream gauging, and the diversion of
waters for domestic functions.8 Insofar as the allocation of treaty waters is
concerned, water rights are precisely set and priorities of use are well
defined. 9
Since 1945, both countries have found this arrangement workable.
The officers of the Commission, through its national sections, have established a reputation for technical efficiency, procedural conservatism, and
diplomatic skill in implementing treaty provisions and responding to a
range of issues arising under the Commission's jurisdiction. In the past
46 years, however, a great deal has changed within the Commission's
jurisdiction that affects its present capacity and functions.
Changes in the Commission's environment are complex but can
be divided roughly into the categories of demographic and economic
change, institutional and political change, and attitudinal change. The
most obvious changes are demographic and economic in nature. Since
5. M. Jamail & S. Mumme, The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission As a Conflict

ManagementAgency in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 19 Soc. Sci. J. 47-48 (1982).
6. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 2, art. 24.
7. Id.

8. Id. arts. 2-24.
9. Id. arts. 3,4, and 10.
10. S. Mumme, Engineering Diplomacy: The Evolving Role of the InternationalBoundary and
Water Commission in U.S.-Mexico Water Management, 1 J. Borderlands Stud. 73 (1986).
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1945, the constituencies closest to the Commission, those congregated
along the 2,000-mile United States-Mexico border, have quadrupled in
size. In 1950, for instance, the combined populations of the eleven largest
United States and Mexican border municipalities was 1,055,798.11 By 1980
that figure had risen to 4,162,210.12 New 1990 census data from Mexico
and the United States will show even more dramatic figures for border cities, counties, and municipios. Population growth has been accompanied
by an upward trend in border industrialization. Some taste of this rapid
growth may be savored in the explosive growth of the maquila industry, in
which the number of plants has grown from around 600 in 1965 to 1,480 in
1989.13 The rapid metamorphosis of border cities has generated constant
pressure on urban services, to include water supply, sewage and sanitation, education, transportation, and social support.
Such changes affect the IBWC. Whereas the border economy and
much of its population was substantially agricultural in 1945, it is today
preponderantly urban and industrialized. Urban growth and its demands
have qualitatively altered the character of public expectations bearing on
the Commission's role and functions along the border.
Nor are changes in the Commission's demographic and economic
environment exclusively derivative of the realities of urban growth.
Upstream, throughout the major watersheds of the Rio Grande and Colorado River, economic development has meant more intensive patterns of
water consumption and use. Intensive utilization of treaty waters is an
important factor contributing to the reduction of water quality on these
rivers. 14 This is one of the important challenges currently confronting the
Commission.
These changing demographics along the United States-Mexico
border have caused a shift in the dynamic component of the Commission's agenda. While the IBWC has continuous water allocation related
functions, 15 its contemporary agenda is increasingly occupied with urban
support services and water quality problems. Under its mandate to
address sanitation and sewage problems of a binational nature, 16 the
IBWC has confronted a growing number of such problems along the inter11. M. Jamail & M. Gutierrez, The Border Guide: Institutions and Organizations of the
United States-Mexico Borderlands 184 (1992) (revised edition).
12. Id.
13. Border assembly plants are known as maquiladoras,after the Spanish word maquila,
denoting a mill or processing facility. The statistics cited are derived from the La Industria
Maquiladorade Exportacion, 49 El Mercado de Valores 28 (May 15,1989).
14. P. Friedkin, A River No More: The Colorado River and the West 291-315 (1981); M.
Reisner, Cadillac Desert 483 (1986).
15. These include operations and maintenance functions associated with its principal
hydraulic works at Amistad, Falcon, and Anzaludas dams on the Rio Grande, its oversight
of drainage on the Colorado, and gauging and monitoring water supplies allocated under
treaty. IBWC, Joint Projects of the United States and Mexico through the International Boundary and Water Commission (19481).
16. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3.
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national boundary. Problems related to salinity and water quality have
also become more of a preoccupation. Demographic trends and certain
lacunae within the language of the 1944 Treaty further underlie the Commission's interest in groundwater apportionment and problems of flood
and drought management that are related to its jurisdiction.
While basic trends in demographic and economic development in
the borderlands provide the structural foundations of the changes affecting the IBWC, institutional, legal, and administrative changes at the
domestic and binational levels have altered the forums of expression for
public concerns. In the past two decades, many new agencies have been
created at various levels of government with interests and mandates bearing on the Commission's work. Among these are new and evolving institutions concerned with the administration of state and municipal water
supplies, health and sanitation functions, environmental concerns, and
local level binational relations. 17 While the Commission in its international capacity is protected from the welter of municipal, state, and federal
statutes associated with this institutional growth, such growth has contributed to the complexity of its political environment. New domestic legislation has directly affected the national sections of the Commission,
which are not immune to the applications of domestic law.
Perhaps the most obvious example is the case of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 18 and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) created in 1971. NEPA has had a substantial impact
on the Commission as an agency but is most visible with respect to the
Commission's public exposure and domestic influence on the functions of
the United States Section. Under the 1944 Treaty, public scrutiny and participation in the Commission's operations is discretionary to the Commission.19 The Commission is responsible to its member governments and is
empowered to seek public input as deemed necessary by the Commis17. A short list of such institutions would include the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Mexico's Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia, the expansion of Arizona's
Department of Water Resources, the City of San Diego's Office of Binational Affairs, and in
the United States, state environmental protection agencies created since 1971. While no single
source adequately enumerates this institutional growth along the border, some feel for these
changes can be gleaned from Jamail & Gutierrez, supra note 11; On the Border,4 Bull. Mun.
Foreign Pol. 19 (1989-90); L. Herzog, Planning the International Border Metropolis 67-94
(1986); and L. Herzog, Where North Meets South (1990).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
19. Nowhere in the 1944 Water Treaty is the IBWC required to hold public hearings or
invite public participation in its investigations or deliberations. The Treaty does give the
Commission authority to "establish a body of rules and regulations to govern its procedure,
consistent with the provisions of this Treaty and of Articles III and VII of the Convention of
March 1, 1989 and subject to the approval of both Governments." 1944 Water Treaty, supra
note 2, at art. 24. The enabling act for the United States Section alludes to the public relations
of the U.S. Section when it authorizes expenditures by the U.S. Commissioner for "attendance at meetings of organizations concerned with the activities of the Commission which
may be necessary for the efficient discharge of the responsibilities of the Commission .. "
IBWC, U. S. Section, Laws Applicable to the International Boundary and Water Commission,
United States Section 4 (1973).
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sioners or the two governments. Under the treaty, however, there is no
regularly prescribed procedure for public participation and review of the
IBWC's operations. 2u The adoption of NEPA has altered that situation for
the United States Section of the Commission with respect to one class of
functions: construction projects undertaken by the agency. Under its Environmental Impact Statement rules, NEPA requires that the United States
Section conduct public hearings on the environmental worthiness of proposed projects and subjects the domestic components of joint binational
projects to a potential administrative veto by the EPA. 2 1 Under this
arrangement the United States Section, and, thus, the Commission as a
whole, have been compelled to become more responsive to United States
public concern. Similar dynamics may affect the Mexican Section in the
near future under Mexico's new environmental law and supplementary
also require environmental impact
reglamentos, which for the first time
22
statements for Mexican projects.
EPA's emergence as a major player in resource management along
United States frontiers has also altered the diplomatic context of the Commission's functions. With its broad mandate to oversee and regulate the
gamut of domestic environmental concerns, EPA quickly occupied the
functional domain not already filled by other agencies. Along the United
States-Mexico border concern with water quality, air pollution, hazardous
and toxic substances, and solid waste (in other words, those functional
areas falling outside or on the margins of the Commission's formal mandate) found a patron in the EPA. EPA's responsiveness to these concerns
has forced the Commission, particularly the United States Section, to
23
defend its special jurisdiction and to better define its functional limits.
EPA's federal presence has thus created a more competitive organizational
environment than the IBWC had been accustomed to.
EPA's interest in environmental problems along the border has
accelerated the search for diplomatic solutions. In the early 1980s, the EPA
took the initiative in seeking a broad, comprehensive framework with
Mexico for addressing the full range of transboundary environmental
problems. In August 1983, a framework agreement for bilateral cooperation on transboundary environmental matters was signed by then presidents Ronald Reagan and Miguel de la Madrid. 24 This compact, which has
20. See supra note 19.
21. E. Rehbinder & R. Stewart, Environmental Protection Policy 54 (1988).
22. Mexico has recently enacted a new reglamento that requires environmental impact
statements for new federal projects. See Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia, Reglamento de la Ley General del EquilibrioEcologica y la Proteccional Ambiente en Materia de Impacto
Ambiental, I Gaceta Ecologica 32 (1989).
23. M. Jamail & S. Ullery, International Water Use Relations Along the Sonoran Desert
Borderlands 18-19 (1979).
24. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, US.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10827 [hereinafter Border Environmental Agreement].
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the status of an Executive Agreement, designates Mexico's Secretaria de
Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE) and EPA as respective national
coordinators for environmental problem solving along the border, establishes a bilateral consultative mechanism that must meet at least once a
year, and formally involves a wide range of federal, state, and local government agencies in the design and implementation of transboundary
environmental solutions that are appended as annexes to the framework
agreement. 25 Under this arrangement, the IBWC, which retains a leading
role in matters under its jurisdiction,2 6 has been compelled to participate
in a wider variety of issues outside its traditional functional domain. Likewise, the IBWC has been prodded to consult (and consult more frequently) with a wider array of public interests than ever before.27
A final dimension of the Commission's altered operational environment is the complex of public attitudes that may be subsumed under
the label "environmental concern." While no studies on environmental
attitudes and values have been specifically targeted at the border region, it
is safe to say that the border region generally reflects secular trends in
public sensitivities for the United States and Mexico at large. The general
trend has been ih the direction of increasing environmental awareness in
both countries.
There can be little doubt that such broad-gauged attitudinal
changes in the environmental sphere have affected the IBWC. Not only is
the border public more aware of its operations and functions than ever
before, but it has looked increasingly to the Commission to help solve a
number of transboundary environmental problems, even in areas technically outside the IBWC's formal jurisdiction. While it would be an overstatement to suggest that the Commission has become politicized, public
frustration with the IBWC's performance has recently led to an unprecedented level of direct criticism of the Commission and its commissioners-witness a recent editorial in the Nogales Internationalcalling for
the United States Section Commissioner's resignation.2 8 Whether accurate
or not, public perceptions of the Commission's limited responsiveness
underlie the wave of recommendations in the 1980s for broadening its
authority.
These alterations in the IBWC's environment are essentially irreversible and will shape its future into the twenty-first century. They are
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Under the 1983 Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement, the IBWC participates
in a number of functional working groups dealing respectively with air quality, hazardous
materials, water quality, and other issues. The working group process alone has increased the
Commission's contacts with the border public. Id.
28. K. Vandervoet, IBWC Chief 'Chewed Out' by CongressionalQuarter,Nogales Int'l, Nov.
7, 1990, at 1; Hing, McCain criticizes Gunaji on Lack of Concernfor Wash, Nogales Int'l, Nov. 7,
1990, at 11; Time to Fire Gunaji:IBWC Chief's Arrogance, Nogales Int'l, Nov. 7, 1990, at 4.
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certain to be reinforced by current bilateral trends, most notably the initiative for a trilateral free trade agreement between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico. 29 Such pressures have stressed and will continue to
stress the IBWC's responsive capability. Compared to the past, today's

Commission bears greater responsibilities, works regularly with a wider
array of agencies, and contends with a larger, more knowledgeable, and
certainly a more demanding constituency for its services.
Fundamentally, however, the Commission remains a technical
agency whose primary functions are predicated on engineering skills and
impartial scientific appraisal of facts. Its mission has been narrowly
defined by treaty. Its success as an agency is based, at least in part, upon its
commissioners' circumspect recognition of their functional limitations
and full appreciation of the range of formal and practical constraints on
the Commission's operations. In an important sense, the institutional survival of the Commission has been a function of converting its apparent
weaknesses-a narrow range of jurisdiction and functions-into institutional strengths. These limitations shape what may reasonably be
expected of the Commission if it is to conserve its strengths, develop its
functions, and continue to serve its member governments as well as it has
in the past.

CONSTRAINTS ON INNOVATION
In order to assess the possibilities for improving the Commission's capacity and responsiveness as a transboundary resource agency, it
is essential to have a fair appreciation of its constraints, or, to put the matter another way, to know what cannot or should not be done by way of
reform. To this end some discussion of the Commission's operational and
political environment is necessary.
Chief among the constraints on the Commission's capacity and
responsiveness is its organic statute, the 1944 Water Treaty and the preceding agreements that treaty subsumes.30 The most salient feature of the
1944 Water Treaty is that it is a bona fide treaty, backed by the full force of
the two governments, and superseding in authority all lesser international
arrangements and domestic legislation. As Norris Hundley so well
describes, the 1944 Treaty was hammered out with great difficulty.3 1 It
represents numerous compromises between the United States and Mex29. M. Kelly & D. Kamp, Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Negotiations and the Environment:
Exploring the Issues (Texas Center for Policy Studies Discussion Paper, Jan. 1991).
30. The 1944 Water Treaty subsumes a number of earlier treaties, including the Convention
of 1889, which established the original International Boundary Commission. See 1944 Water
Treaty, supra note 2.
31. See generally N. Hundley, Dividing the Waters (1966).
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ico, and among the various basin states tributary to the river waters
apportioned thereunder. It is unnecessary to describe the diplomatic complexities associated with the 1944 Treaty since others have so admirably
done so. 32 It must be emphasized, however, that the 1944 Water Treaty
confers on the Commission a degree of authority within its jurisdiction
that is otherwise unprecedented in transboundary resource management
along the border and that remains superior to any other binational agreement. Any effort to amend the 1944 Treaty, or alter it through another
treaty, would require congressional approval in both countries. That
would raise a political hornet's nest, with no assurances that the current
state of affairs would be improved by the effort.
If this is so, then any effort to address the Commission's jurisdiction and functions through international treaty should be considered with
a great deal of skepticism. While treaty level agreement may, in fact, be the
only reasonable solution for resolving certain issues on the binational
agenda (e.g., trade liberalization, labor migration, and drug trafficking),
such efforts are less likely to succeed to the extent that they are linked to or
directly affect the jurisdiction and functions already entrusted to the Commission.
With just a few notable exceptions,3 3 then, recommendations for
reforming the Commission's jurisdiction and functions must center, if
only for political reasons, on modes of diplomatic agreement subsidiary to
the Commission's organic act. Under these circumstances, the 1944 Treaty
inevitably defines the limits of the possible. It follows, then, that innovation and reform must be compatible with the current institutional arrangements relating to the structure of the Commission itself as well as its
jurisdiction and functions.
If this is the case, it is worth considering the merits of the present
institutional arrangement. As currently structured, the Commission is
composed of two national sections, each headed by a single commissioner
who must by treaty be a licensed engineer.34 Each section's executive staff
32. Id. In addition to Hundley's treatment of the 1944 Water Treaty negotiations see 1, 2 E.
Coyro, El Tratado entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos de America sobre Rios Internacionales
(1975); Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, El Tratado de Aguas Intemacionales (1947); C.
Meyers, The Colorado River Basin, in The Law of International Drainage Basins 486-607 (A.
Garretson et al. eds., 1967).
33. The Commission's functions have arguably been enlarged through separate protocols
and memorandums of understanding between EPA and SEDUE, the best example of which
is the 1983 Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement. That agreement involves the
Commission at least indirectly in considering a range of issues, such as commerce in hazardous substances, that do not technically fall within its formal jurisdiction. See Agreement on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,
supra note 24. As seen later in this article, it might also be argued that certain expansion of the
Commission's present jurisdiction with respect to the management of drought, flooding, and
groundwater warrant amendment of the treaty.
34. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 2.
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consists of two principal engineers, a legal adviser, and a secretary.3 5 The
commissioners and their executive staff are vested with full diplomatic
36
privileges to facilitate implementation of their international mission.
This structure has worked well over the years and is politically
compatible with the de facto state of affairs along the border. Given the
frequently contentious relations among the United States border and
basin states, and considering the difficulties of managing transboundary
relations between two countries with different languages, cultures, and
economic conditions, one can make a strong argument that a singleheaded agency is the best organizational solution. Such an agency facilitates control over information, is more conducive to reaching consensus,
more effective in mediating disputes between constituent interests, and
more directly accountable to superior policy authority.37 The singleheaded structure is particularly compatible with Mexican public administration, which exhibits a marked tendency toward vertical patterns of
command and control. 38 With respect to other requirements stipulated by
treaty, the requirement that the commissioner be a licensed engineer has
both enhanced the Commission's technical reputation and invested the
commissioners with greater capacity for hands-on management of the
agency's technical affairs. 39 And the investiture of its staff with diplomatic
power has greatly facilitated the capacity of the two sections to cooperate
40
and coordinate their respective activities.
The Commission's jurisdiction, as seen above, is confined to matters related to the boundary itself. While such restriction may seem to
some too narrow, it has served to mark a clear jurisdictional boundary
between the Commission's national sections and other domestic agencies.
This exclusive claim has enabled the Commission to survive various
efforts by other more powerful domestic agencies to encroach upon and
41
thereby diminish the IBWC's organizational authority.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. H. Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power 57 (1970). For a more theoretically informed
discussion of organizational structure see D. Katz & R. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations 71 (1966).
38. W. Tucker, Mexican Government Today 121 (1957); M. Greenberg, Bureaucracy and
Development: A Mexican Case Study (1970); J. West, PublicAdministrationand Local Coordination, in Borderlands Sourcebook: A Guide to the Literature on Northern Mexico and the
American Southwest 195-203 (E. Stoddard et al. eds., 1983); Cervantes del Rio, Public Administration in Mexico, 60 Int'l Rev. of Admin. Sci. 1-7 (1974).
39. Mumme, supra note 10; F. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy 84 (2d. ed.
1976).
40. A. Liebson, The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, 35 Mexican-American
Rev. 30-34 (1967); D. Jordan & J. Friedkin, The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission,
UnitedStates and Mexico, 5 Int'l Conf. on Water for Peace 192 (1967); Rio Grande Waterfor Peace,
Engineering News Record 33-37 (July 27,1967).
41, S. Mumme & S. Moore, Agency Autonomy in TransboundaryResources Management: The
United States Section of the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 Nat. Res. J. 678 (1990).
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The IBWC's functional niche within the welter of competing
national agencies and institutions is quite narrow but well protected. This
condition limits the range of functional obligations that can be effectively
pressed upon it. The Commission has absorbed new functions over the
years, but these have been and must be solidly grounded in the 1944
Treaty, and to the greatest extent possible based upon widespread consensus for the extension of its functional range. It has been the Commission's
experience that functional expansion in the absence of such
support may
42
jeopardize its authority in other more established realms.
In such a context the IBWC's commissioners have generally been
loath to take the lead in generating functional claims, even when such
functions were reasonably related to its treaty authority. Instead, the Commission has typically adopted a low-key, mediating approach, preferring
to let its constituency generate the political support before weighing in
support of any initiative with their respective national governments.
If the Commission's capacity for innovation is restricted by its formal mandate, it is similarly restricted by practical political and diplomatic
realities. The need to build consensus among competing interests in support of its functional expansion has already been mentioned but warrants
further discussion.
The political limitations bearing on the Commission derive from
different sources in each country. In the United States, a strong federalism
and powerful national Congress have been the basic arenas in which
agreements related to United States-Mexican affairs have been forged. At
the level of the border states, geographically western arid lands states
with considerable influence in national natural resources policy, these constitutional features have combined with fundamental resource management priorities, principally land and water reclamation, to shape a certain
consensus on the role and functions of the IBWC. Basic to this consensus is
the notion that the IBWC must first and foremost protect the resource entitlements of the border and basin states. 4 3 Another basic notion is that the
IBWC should answer first and foremost to the states, through Congress,
rather than to the executive branch, in this case, the State Department.4 4 In
42. Id. at 682-83.
43. The consensus among the border and basin states is seen in discussion and criticism of
IBWC's initiatives over the years. While no one document is sufficient to demonstrate this
consensus, a reading of congressional testimony before the Appropriations Committees of
the U.S. House and Senate lends support to the notion of underlying consensus on the role
and functions of the Commission. Another indicator, which might be called a crucial test of
the consensus hypothesis, is seen in state level reaction in the solution of the salinity crisis.
Here, several states were quite reluctant to support an extension of the IBWC's authority in
order to deal with the salinity crisis, even though there were compelling reasons for doing so.
For a good discussion of state responses in the salinity crisis see M. Holbert, International
Problems, in Values and Choices in the Development of the Colorado River Basin 220 (D.
Peterson et al. eds., 1978).
44. For discussion of the IBWC as a congressionally oriented agency see Mumme & Moore,
supra note 41, at 670, 676.
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order to generate support for its initiatives, then, the IBWC must attend to
its uppermost priorities before other values are served. It must also generate broad-based support for functional expansion with its state constituency.
For the Mexican national section, the opposite tends to apply.
Here, too, defense of Mexico's treaty water entitlement and territorial
integrity are the uppermost priorities to which other values are subordinate. But Mexican border states have little influence in the affairs of the
Mexican Section, which is above all responsive to the Mexican Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE) and presidential control.45 SRE's priorities
are shaped through interactions with the president and other federal ministries, principal among them the Mexican Secretaria de Agricultura y
Recursos Hidraulicos (SARH), the powerful ministry supervising national
agriculture. 46 Because the Mexican Section need not overly concern itself
with building local consensus, it much more directly articulates the concerns of national authorities. From a decisionmaking standpoint, its
dependence on SRE for policy authority restricts its realm of discretion
and reinforces its role as a technical advisory agency to Mexican government.
These different political orientations restrict what the Commission, in its international capacity, can do. Under the current arrangement,
which maximizes the Commission's diplomatic ability to maneuver and
enables each section to adopt a posture appropriate to its political circumstances, the latitude for reaching diplomatic agreement is enhanced. This
is so, in good measure, because the Commission is able to limit the scope
of political participation in its functions, to preserve a high degree of confidentiality appropriate to the separate agendas of the two governments,
and maintain a well-defined order of priorities satisfying to its respective
authorities. Modification of the present state of affairs is bound to complicate the relations between each national section and other players in its
respective authority system.
Unfortunately, that may be a moot point. As our review of the
Commission's external environment reveals, some innovation and change
may be necessary, even inevitable. The challenge before the Commission
is adapting to change in ways that simultaneously preserve its diplomatic
advantages and protect its national clienteles' resource management values.
45. An in-depth description of the Mexican Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores is found in
L. Koslow, Mexican Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Mutual Adjustment of Needs and
Independence (1969)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation). See also Tucker, supra note 38, at 182.
46. The role of the Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos in policymaking
related to water is discussed in Enriquez Coyro, supra note 32; E. Lopez, Zamora, El Agua, La
Tierra, Los Hombres de Mexico 65-94 (1977); Greenberg, supranote 38.
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AN AGENDA FOR INNOVATION
Demands that the IBWC more effectively respond to transboundary environmental problems fall into three general categories: first, greater
responsiveness to border constituencies; second, functional expansion;
and third, increased financial capacity. Public demands for responsiveness, of course, are often related to demands for functional expansion,
which may be contingent on budgetary support. Nevertheless, it is useful
to consider each of these concerns separately.
The Need for Responsiveness
Over the past decade, the Commission has been criticized, mainly
in the United States, for its failure to respond satisfactorily to various constituencies. 47 Not only is the Commission perceived to be unresponsive to
certain constituencies, but its limited responsiveness is thought to diminish its capacity to participate in managing transboundary environmental
problems, even those which may fall uncontroversially within its functional reach. The first aspect of this concern with responsiveness might
well be labeled a public relations problem; the second aspect, however, is
fundamentally related to effective performance of a treaty-mandated
function, namely, to investigate and report on environmental problems
related to its jurisdiction.
It may be useful to address the matter of the Commission's investigative authority before considering its public relations. Under the 1944
Water Treaty, the Commission is endowed with power "to initiate and
carry on investigations and develop plans for the works which are to be
constructed in accordance with the provisions of this and other treaties or
agreements in force between the two Governments ..... "4 8 The Commission, therefore, has considerable latitude to initiate investigations and
make recommendations for action to the parties. By comparison, its Canadian counterpart, the International Joint Commission (IJC), must await
references by joint consent
of its member governments before it can ini49
tiate investigations.
The IBWC has thus taken the lead in investigating water-related
environmental problems along the border. Although they are not formally
restricted otherwise, in practice the two commissioners have sought to
develop the Commission's agenda through consensus. Matters referred to
the Commission by the two governments receive priority. Other matters,
which are brought to the Commission's attention by either one or both of
47. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 23, at 18.
48. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 24.
49. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U. S.-Gr Brit., 36 Stat. 2448, art. 10, [hereinafter 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty].
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the national sections, are considered on their merits for inclusion on the
Commission's agenda. In each case the principal criteria for inclusion or
exclusion is whether it has basis in the 1944 Water Treaty and related
authorization. When the two national sections disagree as to whether a
particular concern belongs on the Commission's agenda, the Commission
tends to delay action until consensus is reached as to its disposition. The
two Commissioners provide "checks and balances" which improve its
effectiveness. 50 Unfortunately, this conservative, diplomatic approach
gives the appearance of stodginess and immobility in responding to border environmental concerns. The Commission has been ill-prepared to
deal with such criticism, due in part to its limited emphasis on public relations.
The public relations aspects of the Commission's operations have
increased in importance with the shift in the Commission's agenda
toward qualitative concerns and the emergence of new interests in the fabric of binational relations. NEPA and the 1983 Border Environmental
Cooperation Agreement 5 ' have provided new fora for these interests, generating new demands and expectations for the Commission's performance.
Despite these increased demands and expectations, the Commission has yet to intensify its public relations activities, nor does it have a
formal obligation to do so. Under the 1944 Treaty the IBWC was endowed,
if only by omission, with considerable discretion in public relations.
Unlike the IJC, the IBWC is left in complete control of its consultative
agenda, subject only to the dictates of its member governments.
Some comparisons to the organic provisions of the IJC may be
instructive here. While the two commissions are given considerable discretion under treaty with respect to their procedural rules, the IJC is
slightly more constrained by both rule and function. Under the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty, which is its basic charter, the IJC is required to
"fix such times and places for its meetings as may be necessary, subject at
all times to special call or direction by the two Governments." 52 The IJC is
also much more an appellate, review, and regulatory board than is the
IBWC due to its mandate to resolve differences related to the use of the
Great Lakes. 53 The IJC must conduct numerous hearings and the treaty
mandates that "all parties interested therein [in any proceeding, or
inquiry, or matter within its jurisdiction] shall be given convenient opportunity to be heard." 54
50. Former U.S. Section Comm'r J. Friedkin, Address at the Roundtable on the International Boundary and Water Comm'n, Assoc. of Borderlands Scholars Annual Meeting, El
Paso, Texas (Apr. 22-25, 1987).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976); Border Environmental Agreement, supra note 24.
52. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 49, at art. 12.
53. Id. art. 9, 10.
54. Id. art. 12.
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These hearings requirements, which differentiate the IJC from the

IBWC in public relations, are further amplified in the IJC's Rules of Procedure, updated most recently in 1964. 55 Under the Rules, the IJC's meeting
schedule is preset at least twice a year (one meeting in Washington in
April, another in Ottawa in October), it must give advance notice of any
public meeting, and most of its records are to be publicly available at the
permanent offices of the Commission. 56 Moreover, the IJC's Rules of Procedure provide that it may appoint "a board or boards, composed of qualified persons, to conduct on its behalf investigations and studies that may
be necessary or desirable and to report to the Commission regarding an;
questions or matters involved in the subject matter of the reference.' 2
These and other provisions in the Rules of Procedure contribute to a public access orientation for the IJC. The IJC disseminates a great deal of public information, encourages participation in its meetings, publishes a
monthly newsletter to report on Commission activities and to advertise
upcoming hearings, and in this and other respects is responsive to its border constituency.58 While critics have argued that it could be even more
responsive,59 it is nevertheless considerably more accessible and responsive to the public than the IBWC.
In at least the United States case, enabling legislation empowering
and funding the United States Section of the IBWC did not specify any
consultative requirements, thereby reinforcing the discretion of the commissioner in this realm. 60 Such changes as have occurred which bear on

55. International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, Rules of Procedure and
Treaty 4 (1980).
56. Such records include decisions, orders, formal opinions, applications, references, public notices, press releases, statements in response, statements in reply, records of hearings,
and briefs and statements. See International Joint Commission, United States and Canada,
Rules of Procedure and Treaty 4 (1980).
57. International Joint Commission, supra note 55, at 11. The IJC has established a number
of advisory boards to assist it over the years. While some of these boards have been shortlived depending on their purpose, others have enjoyed a semi-permanent existence. Several
Advisory Boards currently established by the IJC are the International Air Pollution Advisory
Board for the Detroit-Windsor and Port Huron-Sarnia region and the Water Quality and Science Advisory Boards established pursuant to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of
1978 as amended in 1987. On the former see Baily, Air BoardReleases Report on Detroit-Windsor
Region's Air Quality, 16 Focus 3-6 (Mar./Apr. 1991); on the latter see International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada, Fourth Biennial Report (Mar. 1989).
58. The IJC's monthly journal, Focus, is widely distributed and provides regular information on the Commission's activities. For evidence of the wide range of conferences and hearings conducted by the IJC, see any one of its annual reports, e.g., International Joint
Commission, United States and Canada, Activities Report 36 (1986).
59. See, e.g., D. Beach, Great Lakes PrognosisCritical But Guarded, In These Times 6 (Nov. 8-14,
1989); General Accounting Office, State Department, Need to Reassess U.S. Participation in
the International Joint Commission 8 (June 1989).
60. The two statutes bearing most directly on the powers of the United States' section of
the IBWC are the Rio Grande River Study Act, 49 Stat. 660 (1935), and the U.S.-Mex. Treaty
Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 846 (1950).
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the activities of the national sections have been the result of initiatives like
NEPA and the La Paz Agreement of 1983.
Though it is not really possible, nor likely, that the two countries
will further specify the Commission's consultative functions under treaty,
it is feasible for the two countries to expand the consultative requirements
of the national sections through subsidiary agreement, 6 1 amendment of
the enabling statutes that govern its domestic conduct, or additional
domestic legislation. The question is, Is this really desirable, and, if so,
what form should it take?
Enhancing the Commission's responsiveness to a wider constituency, while carrying certain risks, such as increasing its exposure to the
public at large and potential public criticism, makes sense. While new fora
have been created, these fora do not provide regular access to the Commission. Broadened access to the Commission would therefore seem reasonable. Such expansion could take one or more of the following forms:
regular, perhaps annual, open meetings or hearings with the officials and
public of border communities, permanent national, even binational, advisory boards, or newsletters and other forms of public communication.
Whether one or another of these instruments would adequately
satisfy the growing demand for greater responsiveness by the IBWC cannot be known with certainty at this point. In all likelihood they would fall
short, if only because expectations of the Commission's performance and
responsiveness have arisen in the context of inadequate public knowledge
about the particular constraints on the agency's role in transboundary
environmental management. But it is certainly in the interest of the Commission to take reasonable measures to increase the level of public input in
response to growing demands. If it does not, there is every probability that
such measures will be forced upon it. A recent initiative in this respect
emanating from the office of Arizona Senator John McCain testifies to this
62

fact.

It bears mentioning in this context that much of the responsibility
for communicating an image of responsiveness falls upon the shoulders of
the respective commissioners. Fortunately, over the years the IBWC has
been blessed with effective leadership. Commissioners of the stature of
Lawrence Lawson and Joseph Friedkin for the United States Section
61. Such subsidiary agreements are formalized as "Minutes" that constitute the official
journals of the Commission. Under Article 25 of the 1944 Water Treaty, "[E]xcept where the
specific approval of the two governments is required by any provision of this treaty, if one of
the Governments fails to communicate to the Commission its approval or disapproval of a
decision of the Commission within thirty days reckoned from the date of the Minute in which
it shall have been pronounced, the Minute in question and the decisions which it contains
shall be considered to be approved by that Government." 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 2, at
art. 25.
62. Senator McCain's office is considering a bill that would, among other things, establish
a binational advisory board on environmental issues that would regularly consult with the
IBWC. Telephone Interview with staff assistant to Sen. I. McCain (R. AZ) (Feb. 26, 1991).
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showed considerable skill in responding to an elite constituency of border
and basin states executives, the offices of important regional resource
management agencies like the Rio Grande Compact Commission and
Committee of Fourteen on the Colorado River, and, of greatest importance, federal congressmen. 63 The IBWC was able to sustain such leadership in good measure due to its reputation for technical expertise, political
neutrality, and its tendency to recruit future commissioners from within
the Commission-thereby insuring that incumbents were familiar with
the operating norms and procedures and institutional history of the Commission as a public agency.
Effective leadership, as students of organizational management
are prone to observe, has both subjective and situational components that
defy prediction. 64 It can be nurtured but not guaranteed. In the case of the
Commission's two national sections, recent appointments have been more
political than in the past, introducing outsiders into the management of
their sections. 65 More important, however, is the fact that the challenges
they face are really unprecedented in the history of the Commission. The
growing complexity of the Commission's political environment imposes
demands that can no longer be avoided without cost to the agency itself.
Demands for Functional Expansion
Calls for expanding the Commission's functional reach have emanated from a variety of sources since the mid-1970s. As argued above, the
Commission's capacity to respond to such demands is highly restricted;
indeed, its limited functional range under the treaty accounts for the insertion of other domestic agencies in transboundary resources management.
Despite its limitations, however, there is yet some room for functional
expansion by the Commission. In order to better consider these possibilities it is useful to divide the discussion into two categories: first, opportunities for expansion outside the context of existing treaty provisions;
second, opportunities for expansion that arguably fall within its present
treaty authority
Opportunities for functional expansion outside current treaty
authority are limited. Since the early 1970s, however, several issues have
63. See A. Lamborn & S. Mumme, Statecraft, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy Making: The El Chamizal Dispute (1988), for an in-depth look at the role of Commissioners Lawson and Friedkin in the crafting of the El Chamizal Agreement of 1963.
64. Rourke, supra note 39, at 95.
65. The IBWC's present Commissioner, Narendra Gunaji, comes to the Commission from
a career in academia as a professional engineer-hydrologist. Letter from M. Ybarra, IBWC,
U. S. Section (Oct. 20,1986) (on file with the author). The Mexican Commission has recently
seen the appointment, then transfer, of Ing. Carlos Santibanez, who had little previous experience with the Commission. Commissioner Santibanez was transferred in 1990 to head the
Comision de Limites y Aguas, Mexico y Guatemala, Mexican Section, a move that must be
interpreted as a political demotion. Conversation with A. Herrera, Mexican IBWC Commissioner, in Gasparilla, Fla. (Apr. 20, 1991).
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been considered that fall within this domain, the best known of which
involves transboundary groundwaters. Under Minute 242,66 signed in
1973, the Commission was given authority to regulate groundwater in the
San Luis-Yuma section of the lower Colorado River basin. Minute 242 also
authorized the 1IWC to enter into discussions aimed at reaching a comprehensive international agreement apportioning and regulating groundwater aquifers along the United States-Mexico border.67 It is interesting to
note that in the eighteen years since Minute 242, despite some discussion,
there has been little real progress toward such an agreement. To the contrary, both nations have intensified withdrawals and waged, in effect, a
quiet pumping war
on each other in a race to claim the larger share of this
68
resource.
scarce
The barriers to a groundwater treaty are numerous and growing
ever more intractable. First, any effort to apportion groundwater with
Mexico will diminish the stock of water available to the border and basin
states, particularly in the Rio Grande and Colorado River basins.69 Transboundary groundwater is a common pool resource. 70 As with most common pool problems, individual beneficiaries have limited incentives to
relinquish short-term benefits for long-term gains. Any groundwater

treaty, indeed any treaty addressing any water-related environmental
problems along the border, harbors the potential for opening up long settled distributive issues among the various basin states and between the
United States and Mexico. 7 1 This is a level of controversy that the states
themselves as well as the two countries have a very'large stake in avoiding. Taken as a whole, it is simply politically expedient to pump the water

faster than your neighbor. Second, in recent years, water scarcity has
become even more of a critical issue in the West than
it was due to demo72
graphic trends, federal policy change, and drought.

66. Permanentand Definitive Solution to the InternationalProblem of the Salinity of the Colorado
River, International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 242 (Aug. 30, 1973), 12 I.L.M.
1105 (1973) [hereinafter Minute 2421. For discussion and complete text of Minute 242 see
Minute No. 242, 15 Nat. Res. J. 2 (1975).
67. Minute No. 242, supra note 66.
68. S. Mumme, Apportioning Groundwater Beneath the U.S. Mexico Border (1988); L.
Rohter, Canal Project Sets Off U.S.-Mexico Clash over Water, N. Y.limes, Oct. 1, 1989, at Y3.
69. Id.
70. Common pool, or common property, resources are goods to which each party has
access, the use of which by any party either diminishes or adds benefits to the others. Transboundary resource problems are usually of this type. The incentive to reach agreement rests
in the parties' desire to avoid a "tragedy of the commons." As a rule, the fewer the parties to
the common pool, the higher the marginal incentive of each party to seek a cooperative solution to the problem of shared utilization of the resource. See D. LeMarquand, International
Rivers: The Politics of Cooperation 8-9 (1977).
71. Mumme, supra note 68.
72. S. Postel, California's Liquid Deficit, N. Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1991, at A19; M. Obmascik &
E. Anderson, California Urged to Idle Ag Acres, Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1991, at B1.
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Other issues that various critics have argued require additional
treaty authority include drought, flooding, and the apportionment of
waters in the lesser surface streams bisecting the international boundary.
In the case of drought, scholars have expressed concern with the ambiguity of two essential concepts mentioned in the Treaty's drought provisions,
those of "extraordinary drought" and "serious accident to the United
States irrigation system."73 Because these notions are not precisely specified in Article I,74 dealing with definitions, it remains unclear just when a
drought regime should be implemented, and how to determine the region
to which it should apply.75 The problem is most serious with respect to the
Colorado River Basin, where the Treaty's ambiguity as to implementation
is greatest. In this case, the problem might be settled by a subsidiary agreement under the authority of the 1944 document. The magnitude of the
issue, however, suggests the necessity of a formal amendment to the 1944
Treaty. Anything less would probably not be acceptable to Mexico.
Flooding is another major preoccupation. Although the 1944
Treaty aimed in part to mitigate flooding through the construction of a
series of dams and control projects on both the Rio Grande and Colorado
River, serious flooding has since occurred, most recently in 1983 on the
Colorado River.76 Under the 1944 Water Treaty, Article 17, the upstream
country is obligated to "furnish the other government, as far in advance as
practicable any information it may have regarding extraordinary discharges of water," but neither government "shall have any claim against
the other in respect of any damage" resulting from flooding.7 7 Unfortunately, the conditional phrase "as far in advance as practicable" is vague
and subject to conflicting expectations. In the 1983 Colorado River case,
considerable damage to lower Colorado River communities was wrought
due to poor management upstream. 78 This case demonstrated the need for
better interagency coordination at the bilateral and domestic levels in
anticipating and responding to flood-related emergencies. While it might
be argued that a treaty level agreement should be sought to help mitigate
73. See, e.g., C. Sepulveda, Instituciones Parala Solucion de Problemas de Aguas de Superficie
Entre Mexico y Los Estados Unidos, 18 Nat. Res. J. 134 (1978); A. Utton, Overview, 22 Nat. Res.
744 J. (1982).
74. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1.
75. Sepulveda, supra note 73, at 140.
76. OversightHearingsBefore the House Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs on ColoradoRiver
Management, 98th Cong., 1st Sess (1983) [hereinafter OversightHearings].Additional flooding
problems on the Rio Grande in the Presidio Valley prompted the IBWC to reach Minute 247.

InternationalPlanfor the Protectionof the Presidio-OjinagaValley AgainstFloods of the Rio Grande,
International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 247 (Feb. 7, 1975) [hereinafter
Minute 247].
77. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 17.
78. Oversight Hearings, supra note 76; S. Whiteford & L. Montgomery, The Political Economy of Rural Transformation: A Mexicali Case, in Micro and Macro Analysis: Issues in
Anthropological Research 147 (B. DeWalt ed., 1985).
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flood damages,
most observers, including IBWC officials, think this is not
7
necessary. 9
Failure to apportion lesser surface streams' waters is a lacunae of
the 1944 Water Treaty's provisions.80 Occasional efforts have been made in
the past to address this issue and it has some foundation in the 1944 Treaty,
which attempted without success to reach an agreement dividing water in
the Tia Juana River watershed. 81 With respect to the Tia Juana River, the
Treaty, in Article 16, recommended the "equitable distribution" of its
waters and the development of "storage and flood control" measures to
benefit basin water users. 82 Failure to subsequently agree on a binational
approach, however, led to unilateral efforts by each country to capture the
basin's waters. Other efforts to apportion waters of streams such as the
Santa Cruz and San Pedro rivers along the Arizona-Sonora border failed
due to strong opposition by Arizona's political leadership. 8 3 To complicate the situation, this issue has more recently been tangled up in the
groundwater question since these streams are major contributors to
recharge in the transboundary groundwater basins along the border.
With respect to each of these issues, drought, flood, lesser surface
streams, the impediments to a treaty-level solution are practically identical to those mentioned above in the case of groundwater. While these
issues have become increasingly important, they remain secondary to the
core values of most United States border and basin states who feel that as
upper basin contributors to the basic watersheds, they have little to gain
and much to lose by reopening or revising the 1944 agreement. Thus, it is
doubtful a solution will be reached at this level.
Despite this negative prognosis for functional expansion, there
are a variety of areas where the Commission's functional expansion can be
justified in terms of authority already conferred under treaty. These areas
include expansion of the Commission's staff, water quality, and recreation
and instream flow issues.
Expansion of the Commission's staff requires no additional formal authority.84 Under the 1944 Treaty, the Commission is given considerable discretion with respect to auxiliary staff, subject always to the
approval and support of its member governments.8 5 The Commission's
79. Interview with J. Friedkin, Commissioner of the U.S. Section in El Paso, Tx. (Apr. 24,
1987); comments by Commissioner Friedkin on the 1983 Colorado River flood, Oversight
Hearings,supra note 76, at 769.
80. The issue was raised during the 1944 Water Treaty deliberations but set aside as complicating the principal questions before the negotiators. Most discussions centered on the
case of the Tijuana River. See Hundley, supranote 31, at 133; Coyro, supra note 32, at 898.
81. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 16.

82. Id.
83. S. Mumme, Regional Power in NationalDiplomacy: The Case of the U.S. Section of the International Boundaryand Water Commission, 14 Publius 127 (1984).
84. For an argument for expanding the Commission's staff capabilities see, C. Sepulveda,
Implicationsforthe Future: Design of Viable InternationalInstitutions,15 Nat. Res. J. 220 (1975).
85. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 24.
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staff has varied in size and quality over the years in response to the various needs of the Commission and its national sections. This variable pattern may be expected to continue into the future contingent on the
functional obligations of the Commission and the willingness of its member governments to allocate resources for these purposes.
The Commission's authority to deal with matters of water quality
is potentially quite broad under the 1944 Treaty, but it has been interpreted
rather narrowly by the Commission.86 The basis for its role in regulating
surface water pollution is grounded in the authority of Article 3 of the
1944 Water Treaty, which requires the IBWC to "give preferential attention
to the solution of all border sanitation problems." 8 7 In the case of salinity
problems, such authority is more tenuous and derives from Minute 242,
and definitive solution" to the
which purports to provide a "permanent
88
problem of transboundary salinity.
Under the authority of Article 3, the Commission is empowered to
reach particular agreements on a wide range of water quality problems
along the border.89 In 1979 its authority in this area was enhanced by
Minute 261, which instructed the Commission to give a high priority to
this class of problems.90 The Commission continued to proceed cautiously
in interpreting its broadened mandate. While numerous issues are eligible
for consideration under Minute 261, the Commission has inclined toward
a case-by-case approach to water quality problems located mainly within
its traditional focus on sanitation and sewage. 91 Even here, however, the
Commission has been careful in asserting its authority. Minute 279, which
prescribes a joint international sewage treatment plant to deal with water
pollution of the Rio Grande below Laredo, Texas-Nuevo Laredo, Tamauli86. A. Utton, Mexican InternationalWaters ( draft manuscript) (forthcoming).
87. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 2, at art. 3.
88. Minute No. 242, supra note 66.
89. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 2, at art. 3.
90. S. Mumme, The Background and Significance of Minute 261 of the InternationalBoundary
and Water Commission, Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 223, 229 (1981).
91. Within this orbit it has addressed sewage problems at San Diego--ijuana, the pollution
of the New River at Calexico-Mexical, expansion of the binational Nogales Sewage Treatment plant, groundwater pollution from sewage ponds at the twin cities of Naco, and the pollution of Rio Grande waters by sewage effluent from a number of cities situated along its
course. See the following agreements: Recommendationsfor the First Stage Treatment and Disposal Facilitiesfor the Solution of the Border SanitationProblem at San Diego, California-Tijuana,
Baja California, International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 270 (Apr. 30, 1985),
26 I.L.M. 18 (1987) [hereinafter Minute 270]; Joint Projectfor Improvement of the Quality of the
Waters at New River at Calexico, California-Mexicali,Baja California,International Boundary
and Water Commission, Minute 274 (Apr. 15, 1987), 27 I.L.M. 574 (1988); Conveyance, reatment and Disposalof Sewage at the Nogales InternationalSewage Treatment Plant underMinute 227,
International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 276 (July 26, 1988), 28 L.L.M. 286
(1989); Recommendationsfor the Solution of the Border Sanitation Problemat Naco, Arizona-Naco,
Sonora, International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 273 (Mar. 19,1987), 27 I.L.M.
574 (1988) [hereinafter Minute 2731; and Joint Measures to Improve the Quality of the Waters of
the Rio Grande at Laredo, Texas/Nuevo Laredo, Tamauilipas,International Boundary and Water
Commission, Minute 279 (Aug. 28,1979) [hereinafter Minute 279].
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pas, stipulates "that the Government of Mexico require all industries discharging wastewater to the joint sanitation project facilities to provide
appropriate pre-treatment to assure efficient operation of the proposed
treatment plans." 9 2 Some observers have argued that this provision
should involve the IBWC directly in regulating pretreatment practices in
Nuevo Laredo. 93 The Commission has been content to approach such
problems indirectly, working through domestic, generally local, agencies
than to involve itself directly in the business of regin each country rather
94
ulating polluters.
It remains unclear whether Minute 261 could be utilized to
expand the Commission's functions in the area of groundwater quality.
Thus far, the Commission has addressed the issue only indirectly by dealing with surface sanitation conditions that might affect groundwater quality. In the Naco case, overflow from Mexican sewage ponds threatened to
contaminate drinking water supplies for the city of Bisbee, Arizona. 95 In
the case of Nogales Wash, raw sewage threatens the aquifer associated
with the important Santa Cruz River basin.96 Other groundwater problems, such as the contamination of groundwater by agricultural pesticides
in the vicinity of Yuma, Arizona, have not been addressed by the Commis97
sion, which has not yet found evidence of its "transboundary" character.
Another dimension of the water quality problem is salinity. Binational conflict over the salinity of waters delivered to Mexico in fulfillment
of treaty obligations was the most contentious issue in binational relations
during the 1960s. 98 The specific source of the Commission's authority to
address salinity problems is grounded in several agreements reached in
92. Minute No. 279, supra note 91, at § 20.
93. Telephone Interview with G. Ormsby, Researcher, National Toxics Campaign (Feb. 27,
1991).
94. Recently, the American Medical Association's Committee on Scientific Affairs called
for the expansion of the IBWC's regulatory role in maintaining water quality along the border. Recognizing IBWC's limits, however, AMA also called for the development of a permanent binational environmental commission with broad authority to perform such regulatory
functions. See G. Espinosa, Aumenta la Contaminacinoen la FronteraMexico-EU, Senalala AMA,
Excelsior, June 28, 1990, at 5A.
95. Minute No. 273, supra note 91.
96. The IBWC's slow response to the hazard represented by contamination of Nogales
Wash has provoked strong criticism of the Commission. See Vandervoet, supra note 28; K.
Vandervoet, Nogales Wash Flows Unchecked, Nogales Int'l, Apr. 18, 1990, at A18; K. Vandervoet, Is Nogales Wash Toxic, Nogales Int'l, May 2, 1990, at Al. See also D. Kamp, Implications
of the Nogales Water Quality Scenario (Feb. 16, 1991) (unpublished paper, Border Ecology
Project, Naco, Az.); D. Kamp, Capsule Summaries of Selected U.S.-Mexico Environmental
Problems and Strategies, presented to the Congressional Study Group on Mexico, Session on
U.S.-Mex. Ecology: Respecting No Frontier (Oct. 18,1989) (unpublished report by the Border
Ecology Project, Naco, Arizona).
97. For discussion of the Yuma area groundwater problems, see Groundwater-pollutionoutlook grim, Arizona Daily Star, May 2,1982 at B2; J. Kay, Pecan Groves Use FearedPesticide: Temik
Has Tainted Water Elsewhere, Arizona Daily Star, Aug. 6, 1982, at BI.
98. D. Furnish & J. Ladman, The Colorado River Salinity Agreement of 1973 and the Mexicali
Valley, 15 Nat. Res. J. 83, 94 (1975).
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the mid-1960s with respect to the waters of the Rio Grande and an agreement reached in 1973, Minute 242, which sought a "permanent and definitive solution" to the salinity issue on the Colorado River. 99 The general
foundation of its authority in this area is controversial, however, and
based on a broad reading of the Treaty's intent rather than its specific
language-which was designed to insulate the United States from
any
1 °°
claims on the quality of the waters delivered Mexico under Treaty.
Despite agreements already reached on salinity problems along
the boundary, the incidence of highly saline waters in both the Rio Grande
and Colorado River basins continues to rise. On the Colorado, under
Minute 242, the agreed upon salinity standard for water delivered to Mexico under treaty is 115 ppm above or below the salinity level at Imperial
Dam. 10 1 This sliding scale approach distributes the burden of salinity
equitably but does not address problems arising from the absolute
increase in salinity basinwide. Increasing salinity is due to diminishing
flow on the Colorado occurring as the result of the full appropriation of
Colorado River water upstream in the past decade.10 2 Thus, it is likely that
the two countries will need to arrive at additional agreements to mitigate
the effects of salinity in the future.
A final area of potential functional development is that concerning instream uses of water. Under the 1944 Treaty, Article 3, the Commission "may be called upon to make provision for the joint use of
international waters," to include matters related to "[flishing and hunting" and "[any other beneficial uses which maybe determined." 10 3 While
neither the Colorado River or the Rio Grande in their limitrophe reach1 04
are nationally known for their recreational opportunities (fishing, boating,
sightseeing), regional demand for such uses has increased over time. The
management of such functions has largely been left to domestic agencies
in each country, but the IBWC could be called upon to supplement management and regulatory functions along the international stretches of
these rivers should the two countries so agree. At the very least it will be
involved
in the consideration of binational problems involving these
5
uses.

10

99. Minute No. 242, supranote 66.

100. Meyers, supra note 32, at 579.
101. Minute No. 242, supranote 66.
102. H. Dregne, Salinity Aspects of the ColoradoRiver Agreement, 15 Nat. Res. J. 43 (1975); N.
Evans, Salt Problemin the ColoradoRiver, 15 Nat. Res. J. 55 (1975). See also, Acuerdo BilateralMexico-EU ParaReducir laInficion del Rio Colorado,Excelsior, Oct. 18, 1988, at E2.
103. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 3.
104. As they form the boundary.
105. The case of the proposed Amistad National Recreation Area provides a useful example. Administration of this park is entrusted to the Interior Department's National Park Service, but IBWC's potential role and its 1944 Water Treaty authority are preserved. See
Committee on Interior Insular Affairs, Establishing the Amistad National Recreation Area in
the State of Texas, and for Other Purposes, H.R. Doc. No. 967,101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
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In sum, the development of the Commission's water quality functions remains the most dynamic part of its expanding agenda. The Commission's authority for functional expansion in this area is grounded in its
1944 Treaty mandate and enhanced by subsidiary agreements. In the other
issue areas mentioned above, its formal authority is either less specific, or
grounded in the domestic authority of one or the other sections, or entirely
wanting. The absence of explicit authority is a formidable constraint on
the Commission's functional growth.
Financing Transboundary Projects
In recent years, reform advocacy centered on the Commission has
sought to enhance its fiscal capacity to address certain issues. The financing of transboundary projects has always proven to be a delicate, politically sensitive issue due to the considerable discrepancy in levels of
economic development along the border and its effects on Mexico's capacity to participate in solutions to binational environmental problems.
Embedded in proposals for enhancing the Commission's fiscal capacity to
deal with certain problems is the assumption that while it has often had
the functional authority to address such issues, its need to generate political support for budgetary authorizations was a major constraint on its
ability to act.
It is important to note in this regard that the Commission has,
over the years, developed a unique and equitable approach to the problem
of generating binational support for joint projects. Since 1951, when the
Commission developed the first joint international sewage treatment facility to serve the twin cities of Nogales on the Arizona-Sonora border, its
approach to binational financing has been predicated on the principle of
apportioning costs in relation to benefits. 1ff 6 Under this formula, greater
demand for binational sanitation solutions on the United States side of the
border was interpreted to mean greater liability with respect to the cost,
enabling the United States Section to assume a larger portion of the fiscal
burden for project development. The specific cost-benefit formula and
allocation of costs was in each case negotiated between the two countries
using this general guideline.
During the 1980s, however, the Reagan administration took issue
with this approach to financing binational solutions, arguing that Mexico
should pay its fair share of the cost of binational projects."' 7 The major
106. Enlargementof the InternationalFacilitiesfor the Treatment of Nogales, Arizona andNogales,
Sonora Sewage, International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 227 (Sept. 5, 1967)
(including Joint Report of the Principal Engineers Concerning the Necessity for Enlarging
the International Facilities for the Treatment of the Sewage from Nogales, Arizona, and
Nogales Sonora 4-5); J.Friedkin, The International Nogales Sanitation Project at 4 (paper presented before the Arizona Water and Pollution Control Association, on file with author) (May
31, 1971).
107. OMB Raps EPA for Offering to FinanceMexican Border Pollution Controls, Inside EPA 16 (Mar. 13,1984).
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result of this approach was a retreat toward unilateral solutions. 10 8 The
difficulty of building binational support for transboundary projects on a
nonsubsidy basis slowed the pace of negotiating binational solutions at
the level of the IBWC and led to what many observers believed to be suboptimal solutions to problems under consideration. It has also led to a
new emphasis on the need to provide adequate fiscal resources for coping
with transboundary environmental problems.
While general interest in exploring alternative, creative, financial
instruments for supporting the Commission's functions has been
expressed in various fora for at least a decade, 10 9 actual proposals have
been few. Recently, however, this has changed. Since taking the helm of
the United States Section, the current commissioner, Nandera Gunaji, has
made a major contribution in this area by supporting the Commission's
long-standing approach to project financing and exploring new avenues
of bilateral and interagency cooperation in financing transboundary sanitation projects. 110 Other initiatives have come from border state congress108. The erratic history of the San Diego-Tijuana joint sewage project testifies in part to the
problems arising from a less flexible approach to financing border projects. This project,
which from an engineering standpoint should have been constructed on a gravity flow basis
with the principal facility located downstream in the United States, was originally foregone
in favor of a Mexican-financed sewage facility located upstream in Tijuana. Mexico's initial
rejection of a joint sewage facility was related to its inability to pay an equivalent share of the
projected $730 million cost. The facility Mexico eventually built suffered from numerous
breakdowns, resulting in a continuing health threat to U.S. residents downstream, and was
not adequate in itself to accommodate Tijuana's rapidly growing sewage production; in fact,
a second treatment plant was originally part of the Mexican plan. Finally, in 1990, the two
countries reached an agreement, Minute 283, by which a joint sewage facility will be built in
the United States to deal with continuing sewage problems and replace a planned Mexican
facility that U.S. engineers considered to be suboptimal and less reliable as a mechanism of
managing Tijuana's growing sewage production. The allocation of costs for this latest binational solution to the sewage problem appears to follow along the lines of apportioning costs
relative to benefits. See S. Mumme & J.Nalven, NationalPerspectives on ManagingTransboundary Environmental Hazards: The U.S.-Mexico Border Region, 3 J. Borderlands Stud. 52 (1988);
ConceptualPlanfor the InternationalSolution to the Border SanitationProblem in San Diego, California-Tijuana,Baja California,International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 283
(July 2, 1990) [hereinafter Minute 2831.
109. See, e.g., Kamp, Capsule summaries of Selected U.S.-Mexico Environmental Problems
and Strategies, presented to the Congressional Study Group on Mexico, Session on U.S.-Mex.
Ecology: Respecting No Frontier (unpublished paper by the Border Ecology Project, Naco,
Arizona) (Oct. 18, 1989); Metzner, Water Quality Issues of the San Diego-Tijuana Border
Region 11(San Diego State University, Institute for the Regional Study of the Californias, Border Issues Series No. 5, 1989).
110. Commissioner Gunaji's leadership in the area of project financing was a key factor contributing to the IBWC's recent success in reaching a "permanent and definitive" solution to
the long-standing San Diego-Tijuana sewage problem. Financial elements of the project
include A) allowing Mexico to substitute its financial participation in the joint plant for its earlier commitment under Minute 270 to construct at its own expense a second domestic sewage
treatment plant at Rio El Alamar; B) allocating to each country responsibility for covering the
costs of construction, operation, and maintenance of the conveyance infrastructure in its
domain; and C) providing Mexico the option of covering all or part of its costs by supplying
electrical energy for the operation of the international treatment plant. Commissioner Gunaji
has also worked out a mechanism for cofinancing the U.S. obligation on the project. His efforts
in this regard represent the kind of creative problem solving that will be increasingly necessary
in cobbling together binational funding solutions. See, Minute No. 283, supra note 108.
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men. In 1989, Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini introduced legislation to
create a binational contingency fund to deal with air pollution along the
United States-Mexico border, attached as an amendment to the 1990
Clean Air Act.111 While this legislation was unsuccessful, DeConcini's Arizona colleague, Senator John McCain, has recently introduced a similar
proposal that would create a $10 million contingency fund at EPA, and a
$5 million contingency fund at the IBWC that could be drawn upon to
respond to potential environmental emergencies along the borquickly
11 2
der.
It is important to recognize that the Commission itself must be
cautious in approaching this issue. While the Commission does favor its
traditional approach of allocating costs in proportion to benefits, it has
been careful to justify its budgetary requests on a per-project basis, with
careful consideration of the various competing interests involved. The
United States Section, which must gain the support of various congressional committees for its proposals, has developed a reputation for carefully justifying its proposals based on established, well-defined treaty
authority and broadly based political support from its border and basin
state constituency. Its fiscal conservatism has shielded it from "pork-barrel" criticism and contributed to its reputation for113success in negotiating
the complicated United States budgetary process.
The Commission's caution notwithstanding, the search for additional budgetary resources is likely to persist in view of the growing
demands on the Commission in the 1990s and public frustration with the
Commission's slow-paced, but politically expedient, approach to building
support for its binational activities. Its mandate with respect to implementing the several hazardous emergency contingency agreements now
in place along the border underscores the importance of having the fiscal
capability to respond quickly, without returning to Congress in each
instance.114 Greater financial discretion would also contribute to its ability
to initiate investigations and generate proposals for binational environmental solutions within its functional competence. Various environmental
organizations feel that enhancing the Commission's fiscal capability is
critical to improving its overall responsiveness, particularly in light of the
111. Kamp, Senate OKs Border Air Cleanup, Bisbee Daily Rev., Mar. 23, 1990, at 1; Sen. D.
DeConcini, Senate: Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 135 Cong. Rec. 516,371
(daily ed. Nov. 20,1989).
112. Telephone Interview with staff assistant to Sen. McCain, supra note 62.
113. Mumme & Moore, supra note 41.
114. S. Mumme, La Paz Agreement: Progressand Problems in Managing the Border Environment, 2 Transboundary Resources Rep. 1 (1988). Under Annex II to the 1983 Environmental
Cooperation Agreement, the National Coordinators are empowered to form a binational Joint
Response Team to address hazardous materials emergencies along the border. While the
IBWC would under most circumstances participate in this group, no additional funding has
yet been allocated for such functions.
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greater economic integration between the two countries that is expected to
intensify contemporary trends along the border.
CONCLUSION
It should be clear from the preceding review that transboundary
resource management along the United States-Mexico border is presently
in a state of flux. Driven by secular trends related to growth and increasing
economic integration, Mexico and the United States are challenged to provide solutions to a diverse range of environmental problems. As the oldest
and best-established binational resource management organization in
United States-Mexican relations, the IBWC has a vital role to play in the
process of conserving natural resources and combating pollution along
the international frontier.
As an international resource management agency, however, the
Commission's jurisdiction and functions have been narrowly conceived
and carefully defined so as not to conflict with those of domestic agencies
in each country. While the Commission has substantial discretion to initiate investigations and shape its issue-agenda, its original and still primary mandate remains the allocation of treaty water and resolution of
disputes concerning the location of the boundary. In the new context of
heightened environmental concern along the border, the Commission's
traditional approach to environmental management has been hard
pressed.
Much of the difficulty seems to arise from the inherent tension
between a management approach that is historically oriented toward the
distribution of resources along border and growing pressures which have
thrust the Commission into a more visible and contentious regulatory role
in addressing transboundary environmental problems. A new and growing constituency of "nontraditional" interests, including border municipalities, civic groups, and environmental organizations, have
"discovered" the Conunission and sought to push it in the direction of a
more activist role in ameliorating transboundary resource and pollution
problems. As the only genuinely binational institution available it is natural that the IBWC should become a pole of attraction for interests seeking
federal assistance in coping with localized problems along the border.
The Commission's capacity to respond to such pressures is confined mainly to water related problems along the border. Even in this particular sphere, where it already has considerable authority for functional
development, the Commission's experience over the years in defending
and enlarging its organizational turf leads it to react conservatively in the
face of demands for change. Viewed strictly from an organizational standpoint, such behavior has proven successful in preserving its core functions
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and enabling the Commission to reinforce its reputation as a policy-effective, technically efficient organization.
The changing political environment affecting the Commission,
however, has altered the equation. No longer can the Commission opt out
of controversy, retaining a low profile while brokering differences
between the two countries for its respective federal and state governments. As seen above, NEPA, the La Paz Agreement, and the new activism
of local organization have thrust the Commission into the limelight. Failure to respond to these pressures in a constructive fashion may well jeopardize the IBWC's well-earned reputation along the border and provoke a
political backlash that would further diminish its effectiveness.
It is important to recognize that the Commission's mandate does
constitute a considerable restraint on its ability to undertake functions
outside its traditional domain. The political priorities of the two countries
and the various subnational units of government, particularly on the
United States side of the border, also inhibit the Commission's development. The emerging regime for binational environmental management
must therefore engage a wide range of organizations outside the Commission's limits. Under the La Paz Agreement, the EPA and SEDUE have for
their respective countries already begun to occupy policy space provided
by the Commission's limited mandate. States, municipalities, and nongovernmental organizations are also filling the void. Within the Commission's functional limits, however, there is a sizable realm for functional
development and innovation.
In sum, as the Commission faces the future, it cannot stand still.
While a large part of its commitments remain vested in its many operational and maintenance activities and dedicated to the discharge of traditional functions, it must respond to its changing environment. In
particular, it must become more responsive to a growing and more diversified public and more accustomed to playing a regulatory role in coordination with other domestic agencies and government to government
initiatives. Such adjustments should strengthen the agency as it moves
into its second century of transboundary management.

